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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 43992 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) LATAH COUNTY NO. CR 2015-2925 
v.     ) 
     ) 
CLINTON MARCUS CRANE, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 After Clinton Marcus Crane pled guilty to felony driving under the influence, the 
district court sentenced him to eight years, with two years fixed. Mr. Crane moved 
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) for a reduction in his sentence, which the 
district court denied. Mr. Crane appeals to this Court, asserting that the district court 
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence and denying his Rule 35 
motion. 
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 According to the presentence report (“PSI”), Mr. Crane tipped over and crashed a 
loaded log truck going around a corner on Highway 99. (PSI,1 pp.2–3; Idaho State 
Police Report, p.3.) Mr. Crane’s employer owned the truck. (PSI, pp.11–12; R., p.12.) 
The police administered a breath test to Mr. Crane with a result of .232/.221 blood 
alcohol concentration. (PSI, p.3.)  
 The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Crane committed the crime of 
driving under the influence of alcohol, a felony due to a prior felony driving under the 
influence conviction. (R., pp.9–10.) Mr. Crane waived a preliminary hearing, and the 
magistrate bound him over to district court. (R., pp.36–37, 40.) The State filed an 
Information charging Mr. Crane with felony driving under the influence. (R., pp.41–42.) 
Mr. Crane pled guilty as charged. (R., pp.48–49; Tr. Vol. I,2 p.6, L.15–p.8, L.4, p.18, 
L.17–p.19, L.4.) The district court sentenced him to eight years, with two years fixed. 
(R., pp.51–53; Tr. Vol. II, p.29, L.25–p.30, L.3.) Mr. Crane filed a timely Notice of Appeal 
from the district court’s Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.55–58, 60–61.)  
 Mr. Crane filed a motion pursuant to Rule 35 for a six-month reduction in the 
fixed portion of his sentence, but a six-month increase in the determinate portion of his 
sentence, so his total sentence would remain eight years. (R., pp.73–74, 76–77 
(amended Rule 35 motion).) The district court denied his motion. (Aug. R., pp.1–4.)  
                                            
1 Citations to the PSI and other confidential exhibits refer to the document and its 
internal pagination.  
2 There are three transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the entry 
of plea hearing. The second, cited at Volume II, contains day one of the sentencing 




1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
eight years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Crane, following his guilty plea to 
felony driving under the influence? 
 







The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Eight 
Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Crane, Following His Guilty Plea To Felony 
Driving Under The Influence 
 
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an 
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court 
imposing the sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. 
Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Crane’s sentence 
does not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 18-8005(6). Accordingly, to show 
that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Crane “must show that the sentence, 
in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” 
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).  
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be 
tailored to the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 
445, 483 (2012) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)). 
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an 
independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at 
sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) 
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public; (3) 




Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to 
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the 
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 
122, 132 (2011).  
Mr. Crane asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends 
that the district court should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment in 
light of the mitigating factors, including his issues with alcohol abuse and positive 
employment history.  
Mr. Crane’s struggle with alcohol abuse, the impact of his alcoholism on his 
behavior, and his need for treatment are strong factors in mitigation. A sentencing court 
should give “proper consideration of the defendant’s alcoholic problem, the part it 
played in causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for 
treating the problem.” State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). The impact of substance 
abuse on the defendant’s criminal conduct is “a proper consideration in mitigation of 
punishment upon sentencing.” State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5 (1981). Here, 
forty-two year old Mr. Crane began drinking alcohol when he was eight years old. (PSI, 
p.13.) Mr. Crane has had success with treatment programs and significant periods of 
sobriety. (PSI, pp.13–14; Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.14–18.) Prior to his arrest for the instant 
offense, Mr. Crane relapsed and was drinking “as much as a 1/5 of whiskey every 
night.” (PSI, p.14.) He recognized that his alcohol abuse contributed to his criminal 
behavior. (PSI, p.14.) The instant offense was the product of his alcohol addiction, not 
any inherent criminal thinking. See State v. Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115, 118 (1955) (lack of 
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criminal intent as a mitigating factor). Further, Mr. Crane accepted responsibility for his 
behavior. (PSI, p.3.) He also stated that he was “ready to quit.” (PSI, p.14.) In light of 
Mr. Crane’s life-long issues with alcohol abuse, the district court abused its discretion by 
failing to give adequate consideration to this mitigating factor at sentencing. 
Moreover, Mr. Crane’s positive work history and future employment options 
support a lesser sentence. See id. (recognizing gainful employment as a mitigating 
factor); see also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594–95 (Ct. App. 1982) (employment 
and desire to advance within company were mitigating circumstances). Mr. Crane has 
maintained steady employment and has positive references from his past employers. 
(PSI, pp.11–12.) He has experience in agricultural, mechanical, and electrical work. 
(PSI, pp.9. 12.) His most recent employment was in farming and logging. (PSI, pp.11–
12.) Despite the truck accident, this employer told the presentence investigator that he 
would rehire Mr. Crane. (PSI, p.12.) The employer stated that Mr. Crane was “easy to 
get along with,” “always on time or early,” and “very knowledgeable.” (PSI, p.12.) In 
addition, Mr. Crane’s step-brother testified at Mr. Crane’s sentencing hearing that, if 
placed on probation, Mr. Crane could live with him and his family and work for their 
family business. (Tr. Vol. II, p.11, L.1–p.12, L.21.) His step-brother said that he would 
make sure Mr. Crane did not drink alcohol on probation and would contact his probation 
officer if he did. (Tr. Vol. II, p.12, Ls.7–12.) Mr. Crane’s employability is another strong 
mitigating factor that the district court failed to give adequate weight to at sentencing.  
Based on the mitigating circumstances, including Mr. Crane’s employability and 
issues with alcohol abuse, the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Crane’s Rule 35 Motion 
 
 “A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea for leniency, 
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903 
(Ct. App. 2014). In reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court must 
“consider the entire record and apply the same criteria used for determining the 
reasonableness of the original sentence.” Id. The Court “conduct[s] an independent 
review of the record, having regard for the nature of the offense, the character of the 
offender and the protection of the public interest.” State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 
(Ct. App. 2000). “Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence 
under Rule 35,” the Court’s scope of review “includes all information submitted at the 
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to 
reduce.” State v. Araiza, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). “When presenting a Rule 
35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or 
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 
35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). 
 Here, Mr. Crane requested that the district court reduce the fixed portion of his 
sentence by six months, but increase the indeterminate portion of his sentence by six 
months. (R., pp.76–77.) Specifically, Mr. Crane “anticipate[d] being released on parole 
at the end of the fixed portion of his sentence” in October of 2017. (R., p.77.) But 
Mr. Crane felt “confident that he can readily obtain employment if he were to be paroled 
in April rather than October” because of his primary work experience in agriculture. 
(R., p.77; see also PSI, pp.9, 11–12.) Thus, Mr. Crane requested the six-month 
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reduction “to assure his ability to comply with the parole requirement of obtaining and 
maintaining employment.” (R., p.77.) This additional information warranted Mr. Crane’s 
requested modification of his sentence. It shows that he was motivated to maintain his 
sobriety, obtain employment, and otherwise comply with the terms of his probation. The 
district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion. 
  
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Crane respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems 
appropriate or remand his case for a new sentencing hearing. Alternatively, Mr. Crane 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order denying his Rule 
35 motion and remand the case for further proceedings.  
 DATED this 8th day of August, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      JENNY C. SWINFORD 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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